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INTRODUCTION
The limits of interference in human rights by way of intercepting
communications are one of the most controversial problems in criminal trial. Practice
of investigative organs shows that there is still a battle between respect for human
rights and the desire to effectively combat crime. There is no doubt that the use of
these measures is necessary in many investigations, especially on organized crime
or terrorism. Intercepting communications is a technique allowing for most efficient
control over citizens. It is discreet and invaluable as a source of evidence against
suspects. It allows for gathering evidence without persons knowing it. State organs
cannot resist temptation to use tapes acquired this way as incriminating evidence
during criminal proceedings. On the other hand these measures imply a sensitive
limitation of fundamental rights, in particular privacy and the right to a fair trial. A
reasonable balance should be achieved. It seems that in this battle the losing group
presently are not criminals and terrorists but citizens and their rights.
Extensive jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights shows
that in numerous cases the European states cross the line of reasonable balance
and favour efficacy over respect for human rights. Analysis of this topic is especially
important in view of introducing still new ways of monitoring everyday activities
of citizens justified by the governments as the only way to fight terrorism and
serious crime. The European Court of Human Rights evaluates the actions of state
agents and finds that in many cases both law and practice violate the guarantees
offered by the European Convention of Human Rights.1 The Court underlines that
intercepting communications may constitute a violation of the right to private life
and the right to a fair trial expressed in Article 8 and Article 6 of the European
Convention of Human Rights. Therefore it is essential to have clear, detailed rules
on the subject, especially as the technology available for use is continually
becoming more sophisticated.2
1. INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS AS A VIOLATION OF
PRIVATE LIFE
The mere fact of intercepting communications may constitute a violation
of Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights. However, the right to
privacy can be restricted if it is justified by important goals and only in the
boundaries determined by the law. The first paragraph declares the right to private
life while the second one sets out circumstances in which the right may justifiably
be interfered with. Article 8 of the Convention provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public
1
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CETS No.: 005.
2
 Huvig v. France, judgment of 24 April 1990, application no. 11105/84, § 32; also: D. Gajdus, B. Gronowska,
Stosowanie pods³uchu telefonicznego w ocenie Europejskiej Komisji i Europejskiego Trybuna³u Praw Cz³owieka,
Palestra 1994, no. 11, p. 113; B. Kurzêpa, Podstêp w toku czynnoœci karnoprocesowych i operacyjnych, Toruñ
2003, p. 167.
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authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
The Court on numerous occasions examined the essence of such an
interference in private life.
It is not disputed that mail, telephone and email communications are
covered by the notions of “private life” and “correspondence” in Article 8 § 1.
The Court adopted broad interpretation and accepted that the term “private life”
must not be interpreted restrictively.3 Moreover, there is no doubt that interception
of communications is an “interference by a public authority” with the exercise of
a guaranteed right which constitutes an interference with Article 8. Once the fact
of interception of communications is established there is a need to examine whether
in a given situation such an interference was justified in the light of paragraph 2.
1.1 Interference in accordance with the law
Any interference can only be justified under Article 8 § 2 if it is in
accordance with the law, pursues one of more of the legitimate aims to which
paragraph 2 refers and is necessary in a democratic society in order to achieve any
such aim. The Court inspects each phrase used in the list of exceptions from
paragraph 2. From one case to another these phrases acquire special meaning
which becomes part of jurisprudence and is used in next cases. Thus the limits of
interference by a public authority with the exercise of right to private life by way
of interception of communications become strictly interpreted.
Firstly, in order to find that the national law allowing for interception of
communications is in violation of Article 8 of the Convention the Court has to
determine whether, under domestic law, the essential elements of the power to
intercept communications were laid down with reasonable precision in accessible
legal rules that sufficiently indicated the scope and manner of exercise of the
discretion of the relevant authorities. In the case of Liberty and Others v. the United
Kingdom the Court established a three-pronged test. First, the impugned measure
must have some basis in domestic law. Second, the domestic law must be compatible
with the rule of law and accessible to the person concerned. Third, the person
affected must be able to foresee the consequences of the domestic law for him.4
In the case Sunday Times v. United Kingdom the Court established that
the phrase “in accordance with the law” signifies that the interference in question
must have some basis in domestic law.5 The Court has always interpreted the term
3
 In particular, respect for private life comprises the right to establish and develop relationships with other human
beings; furthermore, there is no reason of principle to justify excluding activities of a professional or business
nature from the notion of “private life”, see: Amann v. Switzerland, judgment of 16 February 2000, application no.
27798/95, § 65.
4
 Liberty and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 1 July 2008, application no. 58243/00, § 59.
5
 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, judgment of 26 April 1979, application no. 6538/74, § 49;
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“law” in its “substantive” sense, not its “formal” one. It is thus understood that it
includes also legislation of lower rank than statutes.6 The principle of interpreting
law in its “substantive” sense applies also to common-law countries. “Were it to
overlook case-law, the Court would undermine the legal system of the continental
states” and would “struck at the very roots of the United Kingdom’s legal system
if it had excluded the common law from the concept of ‘law’”.7 The phrase also
implies – and this follows from the object and purpose of Article 8 – that there
must be a measure of legal protection in domestic law against arbitrary interferences
by public authorities with the rights. Additionally in Silver and Others the Court
held that “a law which confers a discretion must indicate the scope of that
discretion”. 8
Secondly, this rule refers not merely to domestic law but also relates to
the quality of law. The Court stated in Sunday Times, repeating its findings also in
Silver and Others v. United Kingdom: “the law must be adequately accessible: the
citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of
the legal rules applicable to a given case”9. There is no sufficient legal certainty
when procedural safeguards appear to be inferred either from general enactments
or principles or else from an analogical interpretation of legislative provisions –
or court decisions – concerning investigative measures different from telephone
tapping, notably searches and seizure of property.10 In Huvig v. France the Court
found the the French legislation violated Article 8 as only some of safeguards
against abuses of interception of communications were expressly provided for in
legislation whereas others have been laid down gradually in judgments given over
the years.
Third, a norm cannot be regarded as ‘law’ unless it is formulated with
such a precision as to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct. The law must be
sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication as to “the
circumstances in which, and the conditions on which, public authorities are
empowered to resort to this secret and potentially dangerous interference with the
right to respect for private life and correspondence”.11 He must be able to foresee,
“to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances”, the consequences which a
6
 Huvig v. France, cited above, § 28.
7
 In Sunday Times, cited above, § 47.
8
 In Silver and Others v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 March 1983, application no. 5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75;
7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75, §§ 86, 87 and 88.
9
 In Silver and Others v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 March 1983, applications nos. 5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/
75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75, §§ 86, 87 and 88.
10
 Huvig v. France, cited above, § 33.
11
 In Malone v. The United Kingdom, judgment of  2 August 1984, application no. 8691/79. In the opinion of the
Court, in 1984 the law of England and Wales did not indicate with reasonable clarity the scope and manner of
exercise of the relevant discretion conferred on the public authorities. To that extent, the minimum degree of legal
protection to which citizens were entitled under the rule of law in a democratic society was lacking. The interferences
with the applicant’s right under Article 8 to respect for his private life and correspondence were not “in accordance
with the law”. As a result of this judgment the British Parliament adopted the Interception of Communication Act,
which was supposed to introduce clear rules of interception of communications, see: R. Ward, A. Wragg, English
Legal System, Oxford 2005, p. 186.
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given action may entail. If he himself is not able to interpret legal provisions, this
requirement is still complied with if he can do so with a need of legal advice. In
Amann v. Switzerland the Court found that Swiss regulations were drafted in terms
too general to satisfy the requirement of foreseeability in the field of telephone
tapping.12 They contained no indication as to the persons concerned by such
measures, the circumstances in which they may be ordered, the means to be
employed or the procedures to be observed. The Swiss legal provisions stipulated
only that “personal data may be processed only for very specific purposes, but did
not contain any appropriate indication as to the scope and conditions of exercise
of the power conferred on authorities to gather, record and store information”.
They did not specify the procedures that have to be followed or the information
which may be stored. That rule of foreseeability could not therefore be considered
to be sufficiently clear and detailed. The Court stated that it did not afford
appropriate protection against interference by the authorities with the applicant’s
right to respect for his private life and correspondence.13 However, the Court pointed
out that the absolute certainty in the framing of laws should not lead to excessive
rigidity.14 It would scarcely be possible to formulate a law to cover every eventuality.
What is more, the requirement of foreseeability cannot mean that an individual
should be able to foresee when the authorities are likely to intercept his
communications so that he can adapt his conduct accordingly.
1.2 Interference necessary in democratic society
As to the next element of the exception from Article 8 paragraph 2 –
interferences must be shown to be “necessary in a democratic society”. Therefore
they should be strictly necessary for safeguarding democratic institutions. The
values of a democratic society must be followed as faithfully as possible. Fulfilment
of condition of “necessity in a democratic society” has to be reviewed in concrete
terms, in the light of the particular circumstances of each case.15 The assessment
depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration
of the possible measures, the grounds required for ordering them, the authorities
competent to authorise, carry out and supervise them, and the kind of remedy
provided by the national law.16 Additionally, the Court has acknowledged that
states enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing the existence and extent
of such necessity. Still, this margin is subject to supervision of the European Court
of Human Rights.
In its case-law on secret measures of surveillance, the Court enumerated
specific conditions which have to be fulfilled in order to consider the precise
legislation to be in compliance with Article 8 paragraph 2. It has developed the
12
 Amann v. Switzerland, judgment of 16 February 2000, application no. 27798/95, § 58.
13
 Amann v. Switzerland, cited above, §§ 58 and 59.
14
 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom judgment of 26 April 1979, application no. 6538/74, § 49.
15
 See: Huvig v. France, cited above, § 30.
16
 Klass and Others v. Germany, judgment of 6 September 1978, application no. 5029/71, §§ 49 to 50.
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following minimum safeguards that should be set out in order to avoid abuses of
power. The legislation must describe the categories of persons who, in practice,
may have their communications intercepted; the nature of the offences which may
give rise to an interception order; a definition of the categories of people liable to
have their telephones tapped; a limit on the duration of telephone tapping; the
procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; the
precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; and the
circumstances in which recordings may or must be erased or the tapes destroyed.17
As to the nature of the offences, the Court emphasises that the condition
of foreseeability does not require States to set out exhaustively by name the specific
offences which may give rise to interception. Sufficient detail should only be
provided of the nature of the offences in question. In Kennedy v. the United Kingdom
the applicant criticised the terms “national security” and “serious crime”, which
constituted grounds for interception of communications, as being insufficiently
clear. The Court disagreed. It observed that the term “national security” is frequently
employed in both national and international legislation and constitutes one of the
legitimate aims to which Article 8 § 2 itself refers.18
Also the warrant on interception of communication must itself comply
with precise conditions. It cannot be general. Indiscriminate capturing of vast
amounts of communications is not permitted.19 It must clearly specify, either by
name or by description, specific person, who is subjected to interception or a
single set of premises as the premises in respect of which the warrant is ordered.
Names, addresses, telephone numbers and other relevant information must be
specified in the schedule to the warrant.
The rule of law implies that interference by the executive authorities with
an individual’s rights should be subject to supervision.20 Supervision procedures
must follow the values of a democratic society as faithfully as possible. In the
Romanian case Rotaru v. Romania the Court observed that this system should not
only exist but also must be compatible with Article 8 of the Convention (which it
was not in this particular case). The Court must be satisfied that it is adequate and
effective. To this means it must contain safeguards established by law which apply
to the supervision of the relevant services’ activities. It should also be carried out
by the judiciary, at least in the last resort, since judicial control affords the best
guarantees of independence, impartiality and a proper procedure.21
In a recent case Kennedy v. United Kingdom the Court analysed carefully
the quality of English legislation constituting the foundation for interception of
communications. Specifically it inspected the procedure for examining, using and
17
 See, inter alia, Huvig v. France, cited above, § 34; Amann v. Switzerland , cited above, § 76.
18
 See: Kennedy v. United Kingdom, judgment of 18 May 2010, application no. 26839/05, § 159.
19
 Liberty and Others v. the United Kingdom, of 1 July 2008, application no. 58243/00, § 64.
20
 See: Klass and Others judgment cited above, §§ 49-50.
21
 Rotaru v. Romania, judgment of 4 May 2000, application no. 28341/95, § 69; Klass and Others judgment cited
above, § 55.
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storing the data and the destruction of intercepted material. On the basis of this
case the Court established that the domestic law on interception of internal
communications should indicate with sufficient clarity the procedures for the
authorisation and processing of interception warrants as well as the processing,
communicating and destruction of intercept material collected. The Court recalled
that in a field where abuse is potentially so easy in individual cases and could
have such harmful consequences for democratic society as a whole, it is in principle
desirable to entrust supervisory control to a judge.22 The intercepted material must
also be reviewed at appropriate intervals to confirm that the justification for its
retention remains valid. All the captured data which are not necessary for any of
the authorised purposes must be destroyed. In case if the surveillance body (in
Kennedy – the Investigatory Powers Tribunal) finds the interception illegal, it
should be able to quash any interception order, require destruction of intercepted
material and order compensation to be paid. If all these conditions are complied
with, even secret interception does not violate Article 8 of the Convention. In case
of the United Kingdom a special body has been created tasked with overseeing
the general functioning of the surveillance regime and the authorisation of
interception warrants in specific cases. The body reports annually to the Prime
Minister and its report is a public document which is laid before Parliament. In
Kennedy the Court concluded that the provisions on control, duration, renewal
and cancellation of secret surveillance are sufficiently clear and accordingly there
has been no violation of Article 8.
However, reviewing the state legislation is not sufficient for the purposes
of establishing a violation of Article 8. The Court has consistently held in its case-
law that its task is not normally to review the relevant law and practice in abstracto,
but to determine whether the manner in which they were applied by the authorities
to the applicant, or affected him in any other way, gave rise to a violation of
Article 8 of the Convention.23 In Kennedy the Court observed that even the best
designed legislative system of control of conditions of interception of
communications cannot be considered to be sufficient in the light of Article 8 if
there are significant shortcomings in its application. Only in case when the
surveillance regime functions correctly the safeguards system should be considered
to be satisfactory.
1.3 Secrecy of surveillance
A significant problem arises when the applicant cannot provide evidence
of existence of interception of communications. A national legislation may institute
a system of surveillance under which all persons can potentially have their mail,
post and telecommunications monitored, without knowing this. Where a State
institutes secret surveillance the existence of which remains unknown to the persons
22
 See: Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, cited above § 167; Klass and Others, cited above, § 56.
23
 See, inter alia: Klass and Others v. Germany, judgment of 6 September 1978, application no. 5029/71, § 33.
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being controlled the surveillance remains unchallengeable. The only way of
realizing that their communications have been intercepted is by way of either
some indiscretion or subsequent notification by the authorities. Without the above
it is never possible for a person to provide evidence of existence of such an
interference with his rights. In Klass and Others v. Germany the Court found that
such a disputed legislation directly affects all users or potential users of the postal
and telecommunication services in a given state.24 Therefore, a right of recourse
to the Court “for persons potentially affected by secret surveillance is to be derived
from Article 25 since otherwise Article 8 runs the risk of being nullified”. The
mere existence of the legislation allowing for interception of communications
becomes a menace of surveillance for all those to whom the legislation could be
applied. This menace “necessarily strikes at freedom of communication between
users of the postal and telecommunication services and thereby constitutes an
‘interference by a public authority’ with the exercise of the applicants’ right to
respect for private and family life and for correspondence”.25 However ambiguously,
the Court concluded that where there is no possibility of challenging the alleged
application of secret surveillance measures at domestic level, widespread suspicion
and concern among the general public that secret surveillance powers are being
abused cannot be said to be unjustified. In such cases, even where the actual risk
of surveillance is low, there is a greater need for scrutiny by this Court. This
finding may be interpreted as a warning for the authorities. The Court declares
that a “reasonable likelihood” of application of secret surveillance must be showed
by the applicant but still welcomes all the applications from persons alleging such
interferences.
Following Klass and Others in a number of cases against the United
Kingdom, where the applicants alleged interception of their communications, the
Court emphasised that the test in Klass and Others could not be interpreted so
broadly as to encompass every person in the United Kingdom who feared that the
security services may have conducted surveillance of him. Accordingly, the Court
required applicants to demonstrate each time that there was a “reasonable
likelihood” that the measures had been applied to them.
For instance, in Malone v. the United Kingdom,26 the Court came to a
conclusion that when the legislation indicates a class of persons against whom
application of telephone interception is very probable a person belonging to that
class can successfully claim to have his or her rights violated. It noted that “the
existence in England and Wales of laws and practices which permit and establish
a system for effecting secret surveillance of communications amounted in itself to
an ‘interference with the exercise’ of the applicant’s rights under Article 8, apart
from any measures actually taken” against the applicant. The Court came to such
a conclusion taking into consideration a special character of a suspect in this case,
24
 Klass and Others v. Germany, cited above, § 33.
25
 Klass and Others v. Germany, § 41.
26
 See: Malone v. The United Kingdom, cited above, § 64.
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who was a suspected receiver of stolen goods. Thus, he was a member of a class of
persons against whom measures of postal and telephone interception were liable
to be employed.
Also broad classes of persons subjected to intercepted communication
may constitute a violation of Article 8. For instance in Liberty and Others v. the
United Kingdom warrants covered very broad classes of communications, including
“all commercial submarine cables having one terminal in the UK and carrying
external commercial communications to Europe”, and all communications falling
within the specified category could be intercepted. In their observations to the
Court, even the Government accepted that, “in principle, any person who sent or
received any form of telecommunication outside the British Islands during the
period in question could have had such a communication intercepted”27.  In the
eyes of the Court the legal discretion granted to the executive for the physical
capture of external communications was, therefore, too broad. The Court
differentiated this case to Kennedy.28 In the last case it had no doubt that carefully
designed legislation and efficient system of control over practical implementation
of these norms – described above – causes that even secret interception of
communications does not violate Article 8 of the Convention.
2.  INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND THE RIGHT TO A
FAIR TRIAL
Using interception of communications as a source of evidence and as
evidence in criminal trials may lead to many different problems. The first problem
arises in relation to admissibility of such evidence, if it has been acquired by the
means of illegal interception of communications. The Convention does not provide
for any rules of admissibility of evidence. However, evidence can be excluded
from the criminal trial on the basis of the right to a fair trial. Article 6 paragraph 1
of the Convention provides that everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law, in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge against him.
2.1 Trial fair as a whole
The Court has stressed many times that while Article 6 guarantees the
right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence
as such, which is therefore primarily a matter for regulation under national law.29
It is not the role of the Court to determine whether particular types of evidence –
for example, unlawfully obtained evidence – may be admissible. The question
which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a whole were fair. Therefore
27
 See: Liberty and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 1 July 2008, application no. 58243/00, § 64.
28
 Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 167.
29
 See: Schenk v. Switzerland, judgment of 12 July 1988, application no. 10862/84, §§ 45-46; Teixeira de Castro v.
Portugal, judgment of 9 June 1998, application no. 25829/94, § 34
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it cannot be excluded as a matter of principle that unlawfully obtained evidence
may be admissible.
The requirement of fairness of the whole trial was set out in the case of
Allan v. the United Kingdom.30 The Court presented there three elements that have
to be taken into consideration in this regard: 1) the rights of the defence have to be
respected, in particular the applicant should be given the opportunity of challenging
the authenticity of the evidence and of opposing its use, as well as the opportunity
of examining any relevant witnesses; 2) the admissions made by the applicant
during the conversations should be made voluntarily, there being no entrapment
and the applicant being under no inducement to make such admissions; 3) and the
quality of the evidence, including whether the circumstances in which it was
obtained, cast no doubts on its reliability or accuracy.
According to these findings, firstly, even if a piece of illegal evidence had
been used, the trial as a whole may still be regarded as fair if the principle of
equality of arms has been kept. The principle of equality of arms in criminal trial
is the key element of the right to a fair trial. The Court stated in Kennedy v. The
United Kingdom that according to the principle of equality of arms, as one of the
features of the wider concept of a fair trial, each party must be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present his case under conditions that do not place him at a substantial
disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent.31 In its case-law the Court established a list
of the applicant’s rights in this regard. According to this principle the applicant
must be given the opportunity of challenging the authenticity of the recording of
his intercepted communications. He should as well have the opportunity of
examining it. He should be able to summon e.g. the police inspector responsible
for the making of the recording. What is more during the trial he should be given
opportunity to oppose the use of illegally obtained interception of communications.
Secondly, the way in which a party can present his case, should be fair. He should
not be tricked onto making incriminating statements.
Secondly, the problem of fairness especially arises where the evidence
obtained is unsupported by other material. Where the evidence is very strong and
there is no risk of its being unreliable, the need for supporting evidence is
correspondingly weaker. The relevance of the existence of evidence other than the
contested matter depends on the circumstances of the case. In Khan v. the United
Kingdom the Court noted that the contested material was the only evidence against
the applicant and that the applicant’s plea of guilty was tendered only on the basis
of the judge’s ruling that the evidence should be admitted.32 Therefore the trail as
a whole was unfair. On the other hand, in Schenk v. Switzerland the Court stressed
that “the recording of the telephone conversation was not the only evidence on
which the conviction was based”.33 In this case it also came to a conclusion that if
30
 Allan v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 5 November 2002, application no. 48539/99, § 43.
31
 Kennedy v. The United Kingdom , cited above. See also, for example: Foucher v. France, judgment of 18 March
1997, application no. 22209/93, § 34; Bulut v. Austria, judgment of 22 February 1996, application no. 17358/90, § 47.
32
 Khan v. The United Kingdom, judgment of 12 May 2000, application no. 35394/97, § 37.
33
 Schenk v. Switzerland, judgment of 12 July 1988, application no. 10862/84, §§ 45-46.
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all the above mentioned safeguards to the accused had been guaranteed and the
trial had to be considered fair. However, another view was expressed in a dissenting
opinion to Schenk judgment. The dissenting judges stated that “no court can, without
detriment to the proper administration of justice, rely on evidence which has been
obtained not only by unfair means but, above all, unlawfully. If it does so, the trial
cannot be fair within the meaning of the Convention”.34 Nonetheless, the Court
has repeated its conclusion on may other occasions.
2.2 Doctrine of the fruit of the poisonous tree
On many occasions results of interception of communications may be
considered to be illegal in the light of internal legislation. Such is the situation
when investigation organs intercept communications in relation to a crime which
is not listed in relevant legislation as constituting a basis for secret surveillance.
As it is illegal to use such interception as evidence in trial, organs gather other,
legally obtained, types of evidence, for instance in a way of interrogation of
witnesses and accused. Later, they present such statements – legally obtained – as
evidence in trial. As the Court cannot exclude as a matter of principle admissibility
of certain types of  unlawfully obtained evidence, once again it must answer the
question whether the proceedings as a whole were fair.
On the example of different types of illegally obtained evidence the Court
has invoked the so-called doctrine of the fruit of the poisonous tree. It observed
that the prohibition on using, in a manner prejudicial to the accused, information
derived from facts learned as a result of the unlawful acts of state organs is firmly
rooted inter alia in the legal tradition of the United States of America. In the
United States of America the obligatory exclusion of evidence relates not only to
evidence obtained as a direct result of a constitutional rights violation but also to
evidence indirectly derived from a constitutional rights violation.35 In Gäfgen v.
Germany the Court related this prohibition to information obtained from coerced
confessions.36 If the illegally obtained confession leads to additional evidence,
such evidence is also inadmissible in court in addition to the confession itself. The
Court decided that the evidence will be excluded if it can be shown that “but for”
the illegal conduct it would not have been found. The “but for” test obliges a court
to ask, if “but for the unconstitutional police conduct, would the evidence have
been obtained regardless”?37 If the answer is no, then the evidence will be excluded.
In the case-law of the Court, it has not yet settled the question whether the use of
such evidence will always render a trial unfair, irrespective of other circumstances
of the case. The Court noted that there is no clear consensus among the European
States, the courts of other states and other human-rights monitoring institutions
34
 Schenk v. Switzerland, cited above, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Pettiti, Spielmann, de Meyer and Carrillo
Salcedo; Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Pettiti and de Meyer, Dissenting Opinion of Judge de Meyer.
35
 See, for instance, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338 (1939); see: J. Worrall, Criminal Procedure. From First Contact to Appeal, Texas 2007, p. 62-63.
36
 Gäfgen v. Germany, judgment of the Grand Chamber of 1 June 2010, application no. 22978/05.
37
 J. Worrall, Criminal Procedure. From First Contact to Appeal, Texas 2007, p. 62.
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about the exact scope of application of the exclusionary rule. It has, however,
found that both the use in criminal proceedings of statements obtained as a result
of a person’s treatment in breach of Article 3 – irrespective of the classification of
that treatment as torture, inhuman or degrading treatment – and the use of real
evidence obtained as a direct result of acts of torture made the proceedings as a
whole automatically unfair, in breach of Article 6.
Such problem appeared in the case law of the Court on the grounds of a
German case, Gäfgen v. Germany, where the applicant alleged that the treatment
to which he had been subjected during police interrogation concerning the
whereabouts of a missing boy, constituted torture prohibited by Article 3 of the
Convention. Therefore the evidence which had been obtained during the illegally
performed interrogation of the accused was in violation of Article 3 and in
consequence also of Article 6.38 The German court had excluded the use at trial of
all pre-trial statements made by the applicant to the investigation authorities because
of the prohibited methods of interrogation in the investigation proceedings. There
was a strong presumption that the use of items of evidence obtained as the fruit of
a confession extracted by means contrary to Article 3 rendered a trial as a whole
unfair in the same way as the use of the extracted confession itself. However, in
the particular circumstances of the case, it had been the applicant’s new confession
at the trial which had been the essential basis for his conviction.39 The Court
considered that using these pieces of evidence in trial was not in violation of
Article 6. The applicant appealed to the Grand Chamber.
When the Grand Chamber ruled on the problem it stressed again that it
cannot decide whether evidence obtained unlawfully in terms of domestic law
should be considered inadmissible. It can only answer the question whether the
proceedings as a whole were fair. The Court observed that incriminating evidence
obtained as a result of acts of violence, at least if those acts had to be characterised
as torture, should never be relied on as a proof of guilt, irrespective of its probative
value. It agreed with the applicant that the effective protection of individuals from
the use of investigation methods that breach Article 3 may require the exclusion
from use at trial of real evidence which has been obtained as the result of any
violation of Article 3. Any other conclusion would only serve to legitimise,
indirectly, the sort of morally reprehensible conduct which the authors of Article
3 of the Convention sought to proscribe or, in other words, it would “afford brutality
under the cloak of law”.40 The Court noted that in the proceedings before the
domestic courts, the impugned evidence was classified as evidence which had
become known to the investigation authorities as a consequence of the statements
extracted forcefully from the applicant. Thus this evidence may have become “the
fruits of the poisonous tree”. In a Solomon judgment the Grand Chamber decided
that “a criminal trial’s fairness and the effective protection of the absolute
38
 Gäfgen v. Germany, judgment of the Grand Chamber of 1 June 2010, application no. 22978/05.
39
 Gäfgen v. Germany, judgment of 30/06/2008
40
 See i.e. Jalloh v. Germany, judgment of 11 June 2006, application no. 54810/00, § 105.
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prohibition under Article 3 in that context are only at stake if it has been shown
that the breach of Article 3 had a bearing on the outcome of the proceedings against
the defendant, that is, had an impact on his or her conviction or sentence”. However,
in this case, it was only the applicant’s second confession at the trial which formed
the basis of his conviction for murder and kidnapping with extortion and his
sentence. Therefore, the impugned evidence was not necessary, and was not used
to prove him guilty or to determine his sentence. It can thus be said that there was
a break in the causal chain leading from the prohibited methods of investigation to
the applicant’s conviction. The failure to exclude the impugned evidence, secured
following a statement extracted by means of inhuman treatment, did not have a
bearing on the applicant’s conviction and sentence. As the applicant’s defence
rights and his right not to incriminate himself have likewise been respected, his
trial as a whole was considered to have been fair.41 Reasoning of the Court reminded
the Wong Sun case from the United States.42 The Supreme Court of the United
States determined in this case that statements provided by a defendant who was
illegally arrested and released but later returned to the police station on his own
initiative were admissible because the statements did not result from the illegal
arrest. The Supreme Court noted that his later statement “dissipated the taint of
the initial unconstitutional act”.43
On numerous occasions the Court indicated that evidence obtained illegally
at the preparatory stage of proceedings and used during the trial prejudice the
fairness. For instance, the absence of a lawyer at the time the applicant was
questioned by the police can irretrievably prejudice the fairness of the criminal
proceedings.44 In Panovits v. Cyprus an applicant made an incriminating statement
in the absence of his guardian and without sufficient information about his right to
receive legal representation or of his right to remain silent. The Court noted that
the applicant’s confession obtained in the above circumstances constituted a
decisive element of the prosecution’s case against him that substantially inhibited
the prospects of his defence at trial and which was not remedied by the subsequent
proceedings. Therefore it constituted “the fruit of the poisonous tree”. As it was
admitted in the proceedings it contaminated the trial as a whole.
The above mentioned judgments indicate an established line in
jurisprudence of the Court to examine if a trial as a whole does not deny the very
essence of the applicant’s right to a fair trial. It is a different approach than in the
American concept of “the fruits of the poisonous tree”. Firstly, the Court
consequently denies to construct guidelines as to what type of evidence is in
41
 However, it cannot be said that the Court is unanimous in this matter. In joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges
Rozakis, Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power the judges expressed a view that there was a breach of
Article 6 because real evidence which had been secured as a direct result of a violation of Article 3 was admitted
into the applicant’s criminal trial. Partly dissenting opinion has been also presented by Judges Casadevall joined
by Judges Kovler, Mijoviã, Jaeger, Joèienë and López Guerra.
42
 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); also see: Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
43
 J. Worrall, Criminal Procedure. From First Contact to Appeal, Texas 2007, p. 63.
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violation of the Convention.45 The compliance with each of the elements of the
right to a fair trial as provided in Article 6 is always considered taking into
consideration the general fairness of the proceedings.46 Secondly, it stresses that
the mere use of the doctrine of “the fruits of the poisonous tree” does not
automatically render the whole trial unfair.
2.3 Secrecy of surveillance
Another problem arises when the fact of interception of communications
is kept secret, similarly to the situation under Article 8. Secret interception of
communications is usually not disclosed to another party. Even if a legal remedy
is available to a party, it is difficult then to challenge in national courts such
infringement of rights that is not known to a party. Moreover, it may affect both
disclosure of evidence and justification of reasons of a decision. In respect to the
rules limiting disclosure of evidence the Court stated that the entitlement to
disclosure of relevant evidence is not an absolute right. In cases where evidence
has been withheld from the defence on public interest grounds, it is not the role of
this Court to decide whether or not such non-disclosure was strictly necessary
since, as a general rule, it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before
them. The interests of national security or the need to keep secret methods of
investigation of crime must be weighed against the general right to adversarial
proceedings, equality of arms and incorporated adequate safeguards to protect the
interests of the accused .47 In Kennedy v. The United Kingdom the Court emphasised
that the proceedings related to secret surveillance measures and therefore there
was a need to keep secret sensitive and confidential information.48 In the Court’s
view, this consideration justifies restrictions in the national laws. The question is
whether the restrictions, taken as a whole, were disproportionate or impaired the
very essence of the applicant’s right to a fair trial. Accordingly the Court noted
that it is clear from the terms of Article 6 § 1 itself that national security may also
justify the exclusion of the public from the proceedings in regards to the fact of
secret surveillance.
Also a problem arises if the secrecy does not allow for full justification of
reasons of a judgment, contrary to the obligation under Article 6. Concerning the
provision of reasons, the Court emphasised that the extent of the duty of a national
court to give reasons of its judgment may vary according to the nature of the
decision and must be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case. On
the example of British cases the Court decided that according to the “neither confirm
nor deny” policy it is sufficient that an applicant be advised that no determination
45
 I. Sepio³o, , Nieobowi¹zywanie doktryny “owoców zatrutego drzewa” a wytyczne ETPCz, Palestra 2010, no. 9-
10, p. 234.
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 See: I. Sepio³o, Nieobowi¹zywanie doktryny “owoców zatrutego drzewa” a wytyczne ETPCz, Palestra 2010, no.
9-10, p. 226-235.
47
 See: Edwards and Lewis v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 27 October 2004, applications nos.
39647/98 and 40461/98, p. 16.
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 Kennedy v. The United Kingdom, cited above.
Programa de Mestrado em Ciência Jurídica da UENP 129
has been in his favour. However, in the event when a complaint is successful, the
applicant is entitled to get information regarding the fact of secret surveillance.
Consequently, the Court observed if the restrictions on the applicant’s rights
concerning secrecy of proceedings and disclosure of evidence are both necessary
and proportionate – they do not impair the very essence of the applicant’s rights
expressed in Article 6.
CONCLUSIONS
There is no doubt that interception of communications is going to be used
in everyday practice of investigation organs. Moreover, there is still danger that it
will be used in further situations as it has proved to be very efficient as means of
obtaining evidence in criminal cases. We have seen that state authorities will not
hesitate to monitor still new areas of our lives and even change the legislative
basis to be able to do so. Desire of investigation organs to use such evidence in
trial is understandable. It is not against human rights to secretly intercept
communications. However, it can be done only under certain conditions. In its
case-law the European Court of Human Rights has set out conditions under which
interception of communications is allowed. In order to be in compliance with
Article 8 of the Convention the secret measures must have basis in domestic law,
which is accessible to the person concerned and this person must be able to foresee
the consequences of the domestic law for him. Also compliance with Article 6 of
the Convention can be guaranteed only if certain requirements are fulfilled.
Intercepted communications can be used during trial only when the rights of the
defence and principle of equality of arms are respected, in particular when the
applicant is given the opportunity to challenge the evidence. The quality of the
evidence should cast no doubts on its reliability or accuracy and should not lead to
violation of the doctrine of the fruit of the poisonous tree. The conditions relate
also to existence of control system and the content of a warrant.
Internal legislation of Poland allows for tapes from intercepted
communications to be used in criminal trail. Such communications not only provide
information about crimes and their perpetrators but also can be used as incriminating
evidence in trial. There is no need to transform such evidence in form of depositions
of witnesses or confession of a perpetrator.49 The basis for such possibility is usually
set down in legal provisions (such as i.e. the Polish Act on the Police of 6 April
1990, Article 19). As to the doctrine of “the fruit of the poisonous tree”, the Polish
courts has had no doubts that information acquired in an illegal manner and not in
compliance with the legal provisions on intercepted communications cannot be
used in trial as evidence.50 Violation of legal conditions allowing for intercepting
of communications makes it impossible to use such evidence in trial. Situation
can become even more complicated when on the basis of such evidence, which is
49
 M. Klejnowska, Pods³uch operacyjny i prowokacja operacyjna, Prokuratura i Prawo 2004, nr 3, s. 94.
50
 Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber, judgments: of 30 November 2010, case no. III KK 152/10, of 22 September
2010, case no. III KK 58/09, of 26 April 2007, case no. I KZP 6/07.
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not used in trial, a person is forced to make an incriminating statement. Investigative
organs can trick him into making such a statement claiming that they have evidence
proving that he committed a crime. Then it would seem that such a statement
cannot be excluded from trial. However, in the Polish criminal procedure there is
no rule excluding such evidence from trial as the doctrine of fruits of poisonous
tree does not apply. The “indirectly illegal” evidence cannot be eliminated.51 Polish
courts make decisions on the basis of their own conviction, which shall be founded
upon evidence taken and appraised at their own discretion, with due consideration
to the principles of sound reasoning and personal experience (Article 7 of Code of
Criminal Procedure). Therefore they can also make decisions on the basis of
statements obtained in result of obtaining illegal evidence. Moreover, the case-
law of the Court should influence the practice of investigative organs in all the
Contracting States. On the basis of the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights, we could expect that a trial, where such incriminating evidence is
used, should be considered not to be fair as a whole. No court should ignore the
opinion of a human rights organ. The Convention is binding for all the states that
have ratified it and “potentially more powerful” than internal legislation, since it
takes priority over domestic law.52 The state organs have to take into consideration
the jurisprudence of the Court. Otherwise, they risk judgments pronouncing
violation of the Convention followed by financial responsibility.
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